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Notes on the Political Economy of Nationalism
The resurgence of nationalism all over the world in
the last few years can be said to arise, in every case, from a
lack of congruence between "state" and "nation." While each of
these terms is highly complex and controversial, we all know
the main difference between them. The state is a political and
administrative unit, claiming the "monopoly of the legitimate
use of force" over all the inhabitants of a given territory.
The nation, on the other hand, is an "imagined community,"
including the dead and the unborn, who are bound together by
the ties of kinship, language, custom and shared myths that
separate it from other similar collectivities.-7 Thus we can
have a nation without a state, as in the case of the Kurds, or
states that comprise many nations, such as the former USSR and
Yugoslavia, and a nation divided between several states, as in
the case of the Italians and Germans before unification in the
nineteenth century, or the two Germanys and two Koreas of more
recent history.
I.
It is tempting to specify the one-to-one corres-
pondence between state and nation as a sort of long-run
equilibrium condition, which generates persistent turbulence
whenever it is not fulfilled. There are many ways in which the
movement toward equilibrium can take place. A single nation
could establish a powerful state that expands to incorporate
other nations within it. The "subject" nations might then
assimilate gradually to the dominant one, by adopting its
language, culture and religion so that eventually all the
citizens of the state come to feel themselves as essentially
one nation. Something like this is what happened in the case
of the "old continuous nations" of Western Europe, such as
Britain and France.27 In the case of movements for national
unification, one of the states of the common nation, Prussia
under Bismarck or Piedmont under Cavour, prevailed upon the
others by force and diplomacy to create what roughly
corresponded to genuine nation-states.
The problems of nationalism that are exercising us
most today, however, are all the legacy of the collapse of the
great empires of the last few hundred years, that of the
Hapsburgs, the Russians (first under the czars and then the
communists), and the Ottoman, in Central and Eastern Europe and
the Middle East, and the European colonial empires in Asia and
Africa. In almost no case is there a congruence between state
and nation in any one of the successor states of those former
empires. One exception is Austria, the core of the Hapsburg
empire, where we have a mainly German-speaking, Roman Catholic
nation. Hungary is itself more or less ethnically homogeneous
but about a third of the Hungarians in the world live as
minorities in Romania, the Voivodina province of Serbia in
Yugoslavia, and the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia, which has
split into the Czech lands and Slovakia, so that only the
former will be ethnically homogeneous. Yugoslavia is of course
the most intractable case of all with the still unresolved
secession of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzergovina, as well
as the difficult problem of Kossovo and the Albanians and the
many complexities of Macedonia.
In the case of the former Soviet Union, the ethnic
problems are also painfully apparent. Substantial Russian
ethnic minorities are located in Ukraine, the Baltic states,
Kazakhstan and Moldova while ethnic feuds have already broken
out in the Caucasus and some of the Central Asian republics.
Russia itself has substantial minorities such as the Tartars
within it.
In the Middle East, the dissolution of the Ottoman
Empire left Iraq a rich and fertile territory very sharply
divided on ethnic and religious lines, while leaving a large
Kurdish minority in Turkey itself. Sudan has a major ethnic
and religious problem between the Arabized Islamic north and
the African non-Islamic south. Syria and Lebanon, in
particular, have sharp sectarian differences within their
populations.
Dozens, if not scores, of new states were created by
the successive "decolonizations" after the Second World War of
the former imperial possessions of the British, French, Dutch,
Belgians and Portuguese. In most cases, this process resulted
in the formation of states whose borders contained highly
disparate populations, that had not constituted integrated
communities prior to the European dominion. In many cases, as
with the Indians in East Africa, significant components of the
populations were immigrants from other, quite distant,
colonies. Many of these colonial territories had strong
nationalist movements that agitated and fought for
independence, under unifying ideologies that stressed the
common links of the subject populations as against the colonial
rulers. After independence, however, severe conflicts emerged
on the basis of what Clifford Geertz (1973) calls the
"primordial" diversities of ethnicity, language and religion.
In many cases the European colonial states were much
larger and more integrated than their predecessors, such as the
Mughal Empire in India or the sultanates in the East Indies.
The newly independent post-colonial states therefore all faced
critical secession struggles during or soon after their
emergence. In some cases they have been successful, for
example Bangladesh, but for the most part they have failed, as
with the attempt of Biafra to break away from Nigeria.
Another completely different type of state was also
created by the European expansion over the rest of the world of
the last few centuries. This is the type of state established
in the New World and in Australia and New Zealand with settlers
of mainly European origin. Although there are exceptions such
as Mexico and Peru, where significant numbers of the indigenous
populations survived, for the most part these new European
overseas states eliminated the original inhabitants as a result
of disease and warfare. In these states there has either been
a dominant European group such as the Spanish in Latin America,
or a "melting pot" of largely European origin, as in the United
States. In neither case has there been a significant
"nationality" as distinct from simply ethnic problem within the
boundaries of the state. An important exception, of course, is
the French-Canadians of Quebec.
The outcome has been very different when Europeans
settled in Africa. In Algeria the pied noir left after a very
bitter war of independence, as did most of the British from
Kenya and to a lesser extent Zimbabwe. Thus the potential
nationality problem in these cases has been solved by the
emigration of the European settlers. In South Africa, however,
the peculiarly intractable and potentially still explosive
problem remains of how to accommodate three or four million
people of European descent with five or six times that number
of natives and Asian immigrants.
Nationalism is the ideology that animates a people
who feel the sense of cultural identity that we associate with
the concept of nation. It stresses what sets them apart from
others and thus serves as a support in struggles with other
nations within the same state, or in other states. It is
generally regarded as having arisen in France during the time
of the French Revolution and to have spread to the rest of
Europe in the course of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars,
in imitation of or opposition to the nation that founded it.
As Huizinga (1940) has stressed the emotion of patriotism and
the sense of national consciousness and identity can be traced
back to Antiquity and the Middle Ages. These however were
subordinated to the influence of the "universal" religion of
the Roman Catholic church, the feudal magnates and dynastic
states. It was only after national unification had already
taken place in France and Great Britain that nationalism in the
modern sense emerged. This is the "received doctrine," ably
expounded in surveys by Minogue (1970), Alter (1989), Smith
(1979), and especially Seton-Watson (1977).
II.
Despite the vast extent of the literature analytical
"theories" or "models" of nationalism, that attempt to account
for the phenomenon in terms of some unifying Gestalt are
unfortunately rather scarce.
The most ambitious and stimulating theory of
nationalism I have encountered is that of Ernest Gellner
(1983). His theory is cast in terms of an evolutionary view of
the historical process, in the nineteenth century manner of
Comte, Morgan and Marx, in which the economic system is first
based on hunting and gathering, then agriculture and finally
industry. Specialization and the division of labor can be
highly developed in agrarian societies, particularly the
agrarian empires of the Orient, but "culture" in the sense of
an integrated symbolic system based on a written language is
confined to a narrow class of priests and bureaucrats. The
"cultures" of the peasantry, who form the productive base of
the system, are confined to purely local dialects and cults.
Conflict in this type of society is confined to peasant
rebellions or power struggles over control of the state by
different aristocratic or bureaucratic factions, but the higher
culture itself remains invariant and common to all contending
parties, or is acquired by successful outsiders, as in the case
of the "barbarian" invaders of China such as the Mongols and
the Manchus.
Specialization and the division of labor take a
completely different dynamic form in "industrial" society.
Rather than each worker learning a traditional craft and
practicing it for life in a closed guild or caste, as in
agrarian society, all workers must be highly mobile and
versatile between specializations on the basis of a high common
level of general education. Integration of the economy through
market forces takes the place of rent and tax payments in kind,
requiring the transmission and reception of complex "messages"
over a wide area in some common medium. Thus we have the
development of uniform literary languages for efficient
dissemination to a wide public in print. Everyone's horizons
are broadened by these contacts and a common "national" culture
develops for the whole society instead of the previous
diversity of "local" cultures. The incessant technical change
of industrial society requires education to be extended to all,
with an increasingly high minimal level.
If all these changes take place within a culturally
homogeneous society, where "culture" essentially means language
and its usual associations of a shared history, all is well and
the society can progress in a peaceful manner. Contrary to
Marx, class differences based on property and income do not
lead to revolution and are eventually ironed out by competition
in the market place based on merit and achievement. Rewards
are unequally distributed but all have access and the
opportunity to compete.
Suppose, however, that there are two "cultures" in
the society instead of one, in the Gellner rather than the C.P.
Snow sense. Furthermore, suppose that one of them, the
"Hapsburg" or the "Ottoman" one, enjoys an effective monopoly
of public offices and access to higher education, both of which
are conducted in a language distinct from that of the
subordinate "Czech" or "Serbian" culture. Economic development
is at such a level that Czechs and Serbs are active partici-
pants in the economy, but are deprived of the opportunities for
higher public office and education.
This situation creates, in Gellner's view, the
classic "Hapsburg (and points east and south)" nationalism that
has been so potent a force, for good and evil, in Central and
Eastern Europe and the Balkans for the last hundred and fifty
years and is now raging again after the Communist interlude,
with the "return of history" as Misha Glenny (1990) calls it.
In terms of the simple "two-culture" model that Gellner adopts
to derive his typology of nationalisms, the solution is
obtained by the subject nation casting off the yoke of the
dominant one and expelling it from the territory that both
occupied, as a result of war, revolution or voluntary surrender
by the ruling power.
The other main type of nationalism that Gellner
identifies is the "Western liberal" or "Risorgimento" type of
nationalism exemplified by the efforts of Mazzini, Cavour and
Victor Emmanuel to bring about the unification of Italy. In
terms of Gellner's parsimonious theoretical categories, the
difference with the "Hapsburg" case is that the subordinate
group is deprived only of political power, and not of access to
education and general culture. One way of putting it is that
in the "Hapsburg" case the subject people can develop their
national culture more fully only after political emancipation,
whereas they have already achieved their full cultural identity
in the "Risorgimento" case. This distinction therefore roughly
corresponds to the well-known dichotomy proposed by John
Plamenatz (1976) between "Western" and "Eastern" varieties of
nationalism.
Although the leaders of nationalist movements may be
perfectly sincere in the altruism of their motives, which in
fact many of them demonstrate by risking execution and torture
in the course of their struggles for independence, once in
power they become dispensers of patronage on a lavish scale.
Positions once reserved for the alien ruling elite are now
occupied by fellow nationals, and additional opportunities are
opened up by new "nation-building" activities. Typically it is
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the intelligentsia among the subject nations that are the
beneficiaries of the new dispensation. Middle-class jobs in
the public sector for French-Canadians, in replacement of
English-Canadians, is the major outcome of nationalism in
Quebec, in the refreshingly cynical interpretation of the
"economics of nationalism" put forward by Albert Breton (1964).
Gellner also is sardonically aware of this point, in his
parable of how Ruritania obtained independence from the Empire
of Megalomania (p. 61). Examples of massive and economically
ruinous expansions of public sector employment are all too
plentiful from recent experience in the Third World.
One implication of Gellner's model, which to my
surprise does not seem to have been noted, is that it fails to
predict any "nationalist" outcome for the "old continuous
nations" of England and France and, for that matter, Japan.
This is because over the long period of this internal
development these states and nations were able to forge a
relatively homogeneous cultural identity, in Gellner's sense,
and so in his view there could not be such a thing as "old
industrial country" nationalism. Nationalism therefore becomes
exclusively an "ideology of delayed industrialization," in the
sense of Alexander Gerschenkron (1962), associated with a
movement against an alien ruling elite.
But is there really no such thing as English, French
or Japanese nationalism? The French, after all, are generally
regarded as having "invented" nationalism during the course of
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the French Revolution and to have exported it at the points of
the bayonets of their armies to the rest of Europe. The
existence of Japanese nationalism would certainly not be
doubted by anyone who experienced the Second World War in the
Far East, and was it really in a "fit of absence of mind" that
Britain acquired her empire as Gellner (p. 42) implies, even
generalizing the idea from Britain to all of Europe?-'
It seems to me to be a severe defect of Gellner's
approach that he adopts, in common with much of nineteenth
century evolutionary type of thinking, a view of history in
which the collective units being studied (societies, states,
nations) are all lined up on parallel tracks with the trains
leaving at successive dates. What is missing (except for the
implicit spread of "industrial" technology) is any interaction
between the units in either conflict or co-operation. While I
have little else in common with the view of Immanuel
Wallerstein (1974), I share completely his insistence that it
is necessary to study nations interacting within a global
system to make proper sense of the modern world. I see
nationalism emerging from the process of internal integration
and unification, which combined political, social and cultural
factors such as language and religion, in the "old continuous
states" of France, Spain and England, together with their
national rivalry over commerce and overseas possessions
inaugurated by the voyages of discovery. In other words I
would date the emergence of nationalism to the age of
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Mercantilism rather than to the spread of the Industrial
Revolution to Central and Southern Europe, a difference of more
than two centuries.-7
As Schumpeter (1951, p. 211) says, "Nationalism is
affirmative awareness of national character, together with an
aggressive spirit of superiority. It arose from the autocratic
state." The competing states in early modern Western Europe,
engaged simultaneously in the "internal colonialism" of
absorbing border areas and fighting each other overseas for
access to the riches of the New World, each developed both
spontaneously and by design complex interlocking myths of
national identity to support them in the execution of these
activities. While much of this activity was focused on the
glorification of the monarchs, particularly Elizabeth I and
Louis XIV, the extolling of the nation was inseparable from
that of the rulers. As many have argued it was this element of
incessant competition between the industrial units of the
European state system in the early modern period that might
account for the "rise of the West" as compared with the
agrarian empires of the East.-7 In Northern and Eastern Europe
also it is possible to link the emergence of national
consciousness in Poland, Denmark, Sweden and Russia to their
struggles over control of the Baltic trade. Again, strong
monarchs such as Gustavus Adolphus and Peter the Great were
much involved in the shaping of these images of national
identity. *'
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The element of what George Orwell (1945, p. 412)
calls "competitive prestige", inseparably associated with the
idea of nationalism, also appears to have played a major role
in the drive for German unification in the nineteenth century.
In terms of Gellner's model it is not clear why there should
have been any German nationalism at all. It is true that they
were divided into thirty-nine states in the German
Confederation devised by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, but
the rulers were in every case German. The movement was
therefore essentially for unity rather than "independence" from
alien domination. What exercised German nationalists was that
the division of the nation into so many states put it at a
disadvantage with respect to its European rivals, the French in
the West and the Russians in the East. This "competitive"
factor was significant in the Italian case as well, even though
there was foreign domination present in some parts of Italy.
The problems of nationalism in the world today fall
into three categories:
(i) Movements for autonomy and even secession by
ethnically or culturally distinct regions in advanced
industrial countries, such as Quebec in Canada, the Basques and
the Catalans in Spain, and Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales
in Great Britain.
(ii) The break-up of the former Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia into component republics on the
basis of distinct ethnic and cultural identity.
(iii) Ethnic tensions and clashes in developing
countries such as the conflict between the Buddhist Sinhalese
and the Hindu Tamils in Sri Lanka.
The rest of this paper is devoted to examining each
of these problems in the light of the approaches considered
earlier.
III.
The first set of issues raise the question of why
they arise in the first place. In advanced industrial
countries which all of them are (with the possible exception of
Spain) economic development and "modernization" should by now
have welded the different communities together into a
homogeneous national consciousness. Regional concerns always
arise, of course, but why can they not be settled within a
single state, with a federal structure if necessary?
Gellner's answer is that it is not only the level and
extent of development that matters.but whether or not it is
"uneven." Systematically under-achieving groups in Canada,
say, could not have a focal point for their discontent to rally
around if they share the language, religion and other cultural
accoutrements of the majority of their fellow citizens. If,
however, a substantial proportion of some culturally identifi-
able group, French-speaking Roman Catholics, who moreover are
concentrated in a particular region, Quebec, feel themselves to
be denied full equality with their fellow citizens then we have
an instance for an outbreak of a nationalist movement within
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Gellner's model. Of course, the intellectuals who lead the
movement can "do well by doing good" for their community, as in
Breton's model which, as we have seen, is fully compatible with
Gellner's more general formulation.
The claim by Gellner (1979, p. 275) that the model
can account for Northern Ireland is more doubtful. It is true
that the Catholics can be considered an underprivileged group,
but it does not seem plausible to regard this factor as being
responsible for the extraordinary violence and bitterness
associated with the nationalist movement. Better jobs and
prospects for the Catholics would not assuage the long and
tragic history of Irish relations with the English state that
is the underlying cause, which only complete British withdrawal
could assuage.
Gellner (1979, p. 276) quite frankly admits, however,
that his model does not fit the case of Scotland. Here one
cannot argue that the inhabitants of the region are systematic-
ally disadvantaged relative to the rest of Britain. How then
to account for the phenomenon of Scottish nationalism? While
there are certainly enough examples of violent repression such
as the massacre of Glencoe in the past, it does not appear that
Scottish nationalism has the same roots as the Irish, since
relations were peaceful after the Jacobite rising of 1745.
Scots were active and successful participants in British
developments for a long time before the modern revival of
nationalist impulses.-7
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What seems to be involved in the Scottish case, and
perhaps that of the Basques and Catalans as well, is national-
ism as a collective consumer good, that a group demands as a
means of overcoming the sterile homogeneity of contemporary
culture. All are fluent in the dominant community's language,
so that the desire for a revival of Gaelic is not related to
economic performance but is rather in the nature of a luxury
public good that the group desires to consume. The emphasis
here is not on nationalism as a rationalization for a policy of
middle class jobs for members of the group as in the case of
Breton's model. Rather it is on manifestations of the group's
cultural identity through architecture, monuments, literature,
dress, music and so on, which they fear will not be catered for
sufficiently under existing political arrangements.-7
Such feelings by themselves may be insufficient to
generate sufficient separatist sentiment unless reinforced by
memories of historical oppression as in the Irish and French-
Canadian cases. What may reinforce it is whether or not the
region is a net contributor or recipient in relation to the
national budget. In the case of Quebec, which is a net
recipient, the center can use transfers as a bargaining chip to
preserve unity. In the case of Scotland, the North Sea oil was
a factor in the opposite direction. The unwillingness to
continue sustained transfers to other regions, as in the case
of the Lombard League in Northern Italy, is a good indicator of
the erosion of the sense of national identity. There is also
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of course a strong "free rider" element in many of the seces-
sion movements, since they are well aware that defense and
other public goods in most cases cannot be effectively withheld
from them by the rest of the country in the event of separation
IV.
When the Bolsheviks inherited the Russian empire they
were faced with the difficult problem of preserving the
revolution in a vast multiethnic territory that had only been
held together by force. They were ready to do the same but
their rule had at least nominally to be reconciled with their
adherence to the principle of national autonomy for all
peoples. They adopted a federal structure in which territorial
divisions corresponded to ethnic divisions. The structure thus
appeared to be one in which the different nationalities were
joined together in a genuinely participatory way. As it turned
out, however, this was merely a front for a sophisticated
system of "imperial" rule from the center, with the hegemonic
entity not being the Russian monarchy or even the Russian
republic itself but the Party. The ruling elite in each
republic was appointed and controlled by the centrally
organized Party, with a bias in favor of the titular
nationality of each republic, an interesting contrast to the
usual imperial practice of appointing outsiders to administer
provinces. Since these officials were creatures of the center,
however, without any local power base, the essential principle
was preserved. With access to higher education carefully
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controlled, this also ensured that the local intelligentsias
were co-opted into the system since the Party offered the only
"career open to talent." Any attempt at independent ethnic
organization was suppressed ruthlessly.
This Soviet nationality policy thus served both as
the means of implementing the centrally determined plan in each
region as well as a method of controlling the potentially
troublesome ethnic elites. Movements of population from one
republic to another were strictly regulated by an internal
passport system. The policy worked remarkably well during the
expansionary phase of Soviet development when massive
investments under forced draft brought significant returns
despite the waste and inefficiency. As development faltered,
however, the system could only be propped up by resource
transfers from more productive to poorer regions.
Thus, although Marxism, in common with liberalism and
other Enlightenment doctrines, anticipated a "withering away"
of ethnicity in the process of development, the Soviet system
actually preserved and intensified nationality as an organiza-
tional principle. As the discipline of the center began to
break down in attempts at reform, each republic had to look out
for itself. Since the ruling elites reflected the dominant
nationalities in each republic it is not surprising that one
solution to the problem of increasing scarcity was harsh
discrimination against local minorities, such as that of the
Uzbeks against the Meshketian Turks or the Georgians against
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the Ossetians. Conflicts between neighboring republics also
broke out over disputed territory, such as that between Armenia
and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, and over
access to water and grazing lands in the Central Asian
republics.
The breakdown of the center, in the absence of any
intermediate associations of a "civil society", had the effect
of "turning nationalities into political parties" as Victor
Zaslavsky (1992) points out. This "ethnic mobilization" did
not lead to demands for separation and independence in the
Caucasus and Central Asia since these republics were net
recipients of transfers from the center. The Baltic republics
and Ukraine, however, on whose "surplus" the center was
drawing, moved in the direction of breaking away. As Zaslavsky
(p. 114) puts it, the former Soviet Union was "a state which
unites a Norway and a Pakistan" (which is probably unfair both
to Norway and to Pakistan), and was therefore not viable in the
absence of centralized dictatorship.
The bloodshed and intolerance associated with the
eruption of ethnic tensions in the Southern and Eastern
republics fed the strongly negative image of nationalism as a
destructive atavistic force by Western observers and govern-
ments. Two incongruous heirs of the Enlightenment disdain for
the politics of ethnicity, Eric Hobsbawm (1990) and George
Bush, both denounced what the latter referred to in his speech
at Kiev as "suicidal nationalism".
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Zaslavsky and many other writers say that this
negative attitude towards nationalism in Europe and the United
States, while justified for the Caucasus and Central Asia, is
unfair and misguided in relation to the more "Western" or
"European" nationalities, such as the Baltic peoples and
Ukraine and Slovenia and Croatia in the former Yugoslavia with
their higher stage of economic development in comparison to the
other republics, and their Roman Catholic, Lutheran or Uniate
religious traditions. The Slovenian philosopher Tomaz Mastnak
(1992) eloquently defends the idea of the nation-state in
relation to these cases, on the same grounds as those
enthusiastically supported by Western liberals in the
nineteenth century with respect to the Greek, Italian and other
independence movements. He argues that the West, by delaying
recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, encouraged Slobodan
Milosevic and the Serbs to go on the rampage, thus making
"Balkan tribalism" a self-fulfilling prophecy.
These are difficult and controversial issues. On the
question of recognition it is very likely that it was too early
recognition of Croatia and Slovenia that precipitated the
horrifying "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia.-7 There are also very
legitimate questions about the commitment to democracy of the
mostly Communist leadership in these "Western" breakaway states
and their treatment of minorities within their borders. The
substantial Russian minorities in the Baltic states and Ukraine
pose a particularly acute problem. The fact that Milosevic has
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apparently gotten away with his annexations in Bosnia cannot
fail to tempt Yeltsin's successors, whoever they may be, to
intervene in the Baltic states and Ukraine.
V.
The discussion of nationalism in the Third World must
unfortunately be particularly brief and confined to South and
South East Asia. Here once again nationalism can be seen as
the response of the diverse local cultures and peoples to
modernization within a colonial framework, much along the lines
of the Gellner model. The existence of high religions and the
memory of powerful indigenous kingdoms, only recently
overthrown, facilitated the growth of nationalist ideology by
Western-educated elites. Unity was made possible between
ethnically and linguistically diverse subject peoples by their
common opposition to colonial rule, with the language and ideas
of the imperial powers providing the means for concerted
resistance. In a process greatly accelerated by the Second
World War, and the Japanese occupation of South East Asia,
several newly independent states emerged.
Even before the colonial powers left, however, the
ethnic and religious tensions between the local populations
erupted violently, most notably in the separation of British
India between India and Pakistan in 1947. India, with its huge
population and extreme linguistic and religious diversity, is
and will long continue to be a fascinating laboratory
experiment in the saga of nationalism and the nation-state.
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Hugh Seton-Watson (1977, p. 296) asks a good question: "Is
India a multilingual nation or a multinational state?" Despite
powerful centrifugal forces such as the Sikhs in the Punjab and
the Tamils in the south, it would seem that the countervailing
forces of economic development and the cultural unity of the
huge and rapidly growing middle class spread all over the
country are more likely to prevail in the end. Films and TV
are other influences that have integrating power at less
educated levels of the population. The commitment of Nehru and
the first generation of Congress leaders to the "secular"
character of their new polity was unswerving and their legacy
might be strong enough to resist the temptation of Hindu
hegemony, or so at least one hopes, despite the destruction of
the mosque at Ayodhya.
A prominent feature of economic development in South
East Asia during the colonial period was the role of Indians
and Chinese who migrated into the area in response to the
opportunities opened up by the expansion of primary exports.
These communities mainly were involved in wholesale and retail
trade, along with the provision of credit in rural areas.
After independence the Chinese communities in Thailand,
Indonesia and particularly Malaysia entered vigorously into the
wider range of activities that became open to them in
manufacturing, commerce and finance. Integration with the
dominant ethnic group was easy in Buddhist Thailand but
tensions were much more severe in the Muslim societies of
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Malaysia and Indonesia, particularly the former where the two
populations are not too far apart in size. In both societies,
however, the ruling elites have successfully contained ethnic
hostility without discouraging the vivifying enterprise of the
Chinese community which, in combination with development
strategies that emphasize foreign investment and exports, has
brought a sustained rise not only in per capita income but also
the share of it accruing to the non-Chinese majority. Control
of the state by the Malay-dominated UMNO in Malaysia and the
Javanese-dominated army in Indonesia assures sufficient
redistribution from local Chinese and foreign businesses to
satisfy the Muslim majority people in each case.
There are many reasons to doubt, however, whether the
situation will remain stable in the long run. For one thing,
the present arrangement has resulted in extensive corruption
and highly unequal shares within the Muslim majority in each of
these societies. Dissent is contained by tight political
control in what are essentially one-party systems. Any opening
to a more participatory system carries with it the possibility
that the discontent of the masses will be tapped by fundamen-
talist Islamic groups, as has already happened in the case of
Algeria. The combination of a social revolution against a
corrupt ruling elite, together with a xenophobic reaction
against the wealthy local Chinese would be a powerfully
disruptive force. Thus there is a painful dilemma in these
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cases, between the possibility of democracy on the one hand and
ethnic strife on the other.
The example of Sri Lanka is a chilling reminder of
what can happen. This abundantly endowed island had a highly
literate population and advanced social services, together with
a genuine parliamentary democracy. There were many close
historical links between the Buddhist Sinhalese and the Hindu
Tamils, who lived together peacefully in the colonial era and
in the first years of independence. Once the Pandora's box of
Buddhist Sinhalese xenophobia was opened by S.W.R.D.
Bandaranaike however, in the course of competing for political
power, the island became doomed to the all-consuming fury of
ethnic strife in which it is still engulfed, as perceptively
analyzed and documented by Tambiah (1986).
VI.
In concluding these notes on the congruence, or lack
of it, between state and nation, I would like to cite the
opinions of two eminent Victorians of widely divergent views.
John Stuart Mill (1861, p. 309) declared "Where the sentiment
of nationality exists in any force, there is a prima facie case
for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same
government, and a government to themselves apart" (my italics).
He goes on to add, however, that "Free institutions are next to
impossible in a country made up of different nationalities."
Thus, he rejects the nostalgia often expressed in many quarters
for the good old days of the old empires when different peoples
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went about their business peacefully under the shelter of an
alien ruling class. Mill was a severe critic of the empires of
his day, advocating independence for nations that met his high
standards of capacity for representative institutions. The
dilemma comes when peoples are so intertwined that the "one
nation - one state" principle becomes impossible to apply while
at the same time the legitimacy of the center has broken down.
Unlike Mill, Lord Acton (1862, p. 150) believed that
"The combination of different nations in one state is as
necessary a condition of civilized life as the combination of
men in society." He had a highly idealized view of the
Hapsburg Empire, lauding its apparent success in uniting a wide
diversity of nations at different stages of development by a
system of mutual checks and balances that maintained the
effective liberty of each component. In a state based on a
single dominant nationality he says (p. 156) that "The greatest
adversary of the rights of nationality is the modern theory of
nationality." By making the state and the nation commensurate
with each other in theory, it reduces practically to a subject
condition all other nationalities that may be within the
boundary. It cannot admit them to an equality with the ruling
nation which constitutes the state, because the state would
then cease to be national, which would be a contradiction of
the principle of its existence."
On this subject it is unfortunately Acton, rather
than the optimistic Mill, who ought to have the last word.
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X On the concept of a nation as an "imagined community",
see the influential work of Benedict Anderson (1983).
2. See, however, the important new study by Linda Colley
(1992) who argues that a "British" nation was
"invented", j la Anderson, between 1707 and 1837, as a
result of Protestantism, war and empire, in a manner
that transcended, without blending or fusing, the
constituent English, Welsh and Scottish national
identities.
3. Linda Colley^ book, cited earlier, is a convincing
refutation of this view in the case of Britain.
4. See once again the work of Colley, and for the
Elizabethan roots of English nationalism the
interesting new study by Helgerson (1992).
5. See Findlay (1992) for a brief survey of these issues,
with references.
6. See Kirby (1990).
2 Particularly in the army and the empire, as Colley
stresses.
8. Colley argues that the formerly unifying "British"
identity no longer serves a functional purpose, with
the cessation of war and the loss of empire, thus
allowing the old Scottish and Welsh identities to
assert themselves once again.
£ See Glenny (1992, p. 179) for this view.
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